Animal Rights History » Edward Byron Nicholson

» The Rights of an Animal

Edward Byron Nicholson, The Rights of an Animal: A New Essay in Ethics (London, 1879; Online at Animal Rights History, 2003).

CHAPTER III.

CONSCIENCE AND ANIMAL-RIGHTS.

The Conscience of the most civilized people tells them to treat animals kindly—in other words to consult the happiness of animals as well as that of each other.

It is true that in many cases where some selfish pleasure of man is at stake the same highly civilized people will still practice and defend cruelty. This, however, only shows that in most men Conscience has not yet reached its fullest development. And that it is developing steadily in favour of kindness to animals cannot be questioned. John Lawrence, writing in 1802, says "Even the lowest class of the people of this country have become much more mild and rational in their manners, and more humane in their treatment of brute animals (however defective still) than in former times." So wrote seventy-seven years ago a man who was fully that number of years in advance of his age, and whose heart bled for the too frequent treatment of animals in his own day. Yet for many and many a year after, and well into the lifetime of men who are only now middle-aged, the state of the English law and too often of English practice with regard to animals was altogether hellish—no other word is strong enough for it. "In the trial of William Parker (July sessions, 1794)," writes Lawrence, "… Mr. Justice Heath said 'In order to convict a man for barbarous treatment of a beast, it was necessary it should appear that he had malice towards the prosecutor.' Thus, we see, had ¹the mare been the property of this fiend he had escaped punishment." And, after giving another instance of the most awful cruelty that the mind can conceive, Lawrence asks "But who shall prevent this man, seeing he does but torture his own property, for his own amusement and satisfaction?" And the law as laid down by Mr. Justice Heath remained the law of England until 1822. The slow but steady development of the national conscience from that year is best shown by the following extract from Sir Roland Knyvet Wilson's History of Modern English Law, and my notes on it:—

"Cruelty to Animals.—But the case was different as to sports of which the brutality was directed only against the inferior animals. To deal with these required not merely a new law but an entirely new principle of legislation, which was not admitted withoutconsiderable hesitation. ²The first enactment bearing on this subject was passed in 1822. It applied only to the cruel and improper treatment of beasts of burden and cattle. In 1833 an Act was passed for prohibiting bear-baiting, cock-fighting, &c., but only within five miles of Temple Bar, and it was put solely on the ground of the tendency of these amusements to produce idleness, disorder, and annoyance to the public. In 1835 an ³Act was passed which reduced the penalty for illtreatment of cattle, but prohibited bear-baiting and similar pastimes universally, and also contained provisions against the starving of impounded animals, and for the regulation of slaughter-houses. This is the first Act which plainly asserts in its preamble the duty to prevent cruelty as such, reciting that "many and great cruelties are practised to the great and needless increase of the sufferings of dumb animals, and to the demoralisation of the people,"—though it is careful to add, lest those should not be thought adequate grounds for legislation—" and whereby the lives and property of His Majesty's subjects are greatly endangered and injured." In 1849 the protection of the law was extended to ⁴any animal. In the debate on that Act Lord Redesdale stood up in the House of Lords to defend cock-fighting " when fairly and properly conducted." In 1854 an enactment was applied to the whole kingdom, which had already been fifteen years in force for London, prohibiting the use of dogs for purposes of draught. Before quitting this subject it is worth while to remark, that the law as it now stands contains no definition of cruelty, and ⁵ applies to all animals alike," so that foxhunting, battue-shooting, fishing, or steeple-chasing might be effectually suppressed without any change in the law, if at any time public opinion should so far change that individuals could be found to prosecute, and magistrates and juries to convict. A charge was actually entertained not long ago for excessive use of the spur in a horse-race, but the fact was held not to be proved. The question, how far vivisection of animals for scientific purposes should be permitted by law, is at present (1875) under the consideration of Parliament."

So Sir R. Knyvet Wilson. We all know that Parliament ended by putting restraints on vivisection. This was in 1876, and it might have been thought that the 'spirit of the age' would rest for a few years: yet on Dec. 8, 1877, there came out in the Saturday Review—a paper not greatly given either to restless agitation or benevolent crazes—an article headed 'Cruelty to Animals' beginning with a strong attack on the Queen's staghounds and ending with the sentence "All these facts point strongly to a revision of the law."

We see, therefor, that not only in the present century but, as I have said, within the lifetime of men who are now only middle-aged, nay, since men not yet thirty were born, there has been a steady development of our English conscience towards greater kindness to (at least tame) animals—in other words, towards promoting their happiness.

And, when this development embodies itself in laws which fine and imprison a man for using what had been held time out of mind to be his rights over his own property, it is plain that we have already been silently recognizing that some animals at least have some rights. If these laws have not been founded on such a silent recognition, they are unwarrantable curbs on the rights of men.

Indeed it seems to me that between myself and any one who approves these laws there can be no question of abstract principle at all, but only of the open and consistent avowal of a principle, and of a willingness to carry it out in practice as far as may be. He may deny this; but I take leave to tell him that he is only blinding himself unless he can answer⁶ on what other principle he approves laws which, unless barely just to the animals they shield, must be branded as altogether unjust to the men whom they punish.

But, even had no such laws been passed, I might point to the undoubted growth of a spirit of kindness to animals, of a care not only for the safety but the comfort of tame animals, and of an unrest among thinking men as to the killing of wild animals for pleasure; and I might say that of two disputants on this question he was almost sure to be in accord with the more developed conscience of coming generations who set up a standard of right towards which the conscience of the past and the present had been steadily marching.

And, as for those who believe in a wise Maker of men and animals, and who wish to help in fulfilling his end, the same reasons which would lead them to include in that end the happiness of men must lead them also to include in it the happiness of all his other creatures.

Footnotes

¹ The man was tried for cruelty to a mare.

² The Attorney-General opposed it, referring to his speech in 1821 against an Illtreatment of Horses Bill. I find from Hansard that in that year "The Attorney-General objected to the bill as a new principle in the criminal law." The speech of Mr. Monck in the same debate is worth reprinting:—"Mr. Monck considered the bill altogether unnecessary. It arose out of that spirit of legislation which was too prevalent in the present day. If a bill for the protection of horses and asses should pass, he should not be surprised to find some other member proposing a bill for the protection of dogs [a member here said "and cats"]. He thought it better that such matters should not be made the subject of legislation." The bill of 1821 passed the stage in question by a majority of 3, but became a dropped order. As for animals not included in the Act of 1822, they were no better off than in 1794. On Sep. 17, 1832, a woman was charged at Guildhall with skinning cats alive by the dozen. "The prisoner, who said she gets 3d. each skin, was discharged; Sir Peter Laurie saying he had no power to punish her, no one coming forward to identify the cats. She had been in custody before upon the same charge, and declared that she would pursue this means of obtaining her livelihood." On Nov. l7, however, at Bow Street, Mr. Halls sentenced a woman to 3 months' hard labour for the same cruelty, but on what ground does not appear—no owner forthcoming.

³ "Mr. Pease moved that this Bill be re-committed. He trusted that the Bill would be suffered to pass, as it was eminently calculated to prevent the dreadful cruelties which were daily practised towards animals. He would be the last man in the world to support the measure, if it tended to abridge the amusements of the poorer classes; but he was persuaded that it would have no such effect." The passage which I have italicized is the high-water mark of Parliamentary humanity 44 years ago !

⁴ Not so. The law of 1849 protects "any Bull, Bear, Badger, Dog, Cock, or other kind of Animal, whether of domestic or wild Nature" from being fought or baited, but does not protect wild animals from other kinds of ill treatment. It is true that the words "any Animal" often occur, but in the 29th clause it is provided that "The Word "Animal" shall be taken to mean any Horse, Mare, Gelding, Bull, Ox, Cow, Heifer, Steer, Calf, Mule, Ass, Sheep, Lamb, Hog, Pig, Sow, Goat, Dog, Cat, or any other domestic Animal."

⁵ Not so. The Act of 1854, referring to that of 1849, provides that "the Word Animal shall, in the said Act and in this Act mean any domestic Animal, whether of the Kind or Species particularly enumerated in Clause Twenty-nine of the said Act, or of any other Kind or Species whatever, and whether a Quadruped or not." It might be a nice question whether the pheasant did not sometimes come under the head of domestic animals, but the fox and the fish are certainly not within this Act. And, when a carted hind was mangled to death not long since by the Queen's staghounds, the magistrates held that there was no case, because the hind was an animal fera natura, "of wild nature."

⁶A friend suggests—on the ground that cruelty to animals might breed cruelty to men. I am afraid that this also would be "a new principle in the criminal law" and a doubtful one; to carry it out consistently we should have to fine and imprison a man for wasting his own money or smashing his own window—lest by and by (in a moment when his ideas of 'meum' and 'tuum' had got muddled) he might waste the money or smash the windows of other people.