Historical Literature on Humanity Against Cruelty to Animals, Timeline of Animal Rights History

Animal Rights History »» Jeremy Bentham

1789 | An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation

IV. What other agents then are there, which, at the same time that they are under the influence of man's direction, are susceptible of happiness. They are of two sorts: 1. Other human beings who are styled persons. 2. Other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things.*^[122] (Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], "Limits between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation," § 1, ¶ 4)

122. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.* It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation[1789], "Limits between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation," § 1, ¶4 Footnote)

Under the Gentoo and Mahometan religions, the interests of the rest of the animal creation seem to have met with some attention. Why have they not universally, with as much as those of human creatures, allowance made for the difference in point of sensibility? Because the laws that are have been the work of mutual fear; a sentiment which the less rational animals have not had the same means as man has of turning to account. Why ought they not? No reason can be given. If the being eaten were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to eat such of them as we like to eat: we are the better for it, and they are never the worse. They have none of those long-protracted anticipations of future misery which we have. The death they suffer in our hands commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which would await them in the inevitable course of nature. If the being killed were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to kill such as molest us: we should be the worse for their living, and they are never the worse for being dead. But is there any reason why we should be suffered to torment them? Not any that I can see. Are there any why we should not be suffered to torment them? Yes, several. See B. I. tit. [Cruelty to animals]. The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], "Limits between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation," § 1, ¶4 Footnote)

1802 | Theory of Legislation

Cruelty towards animals is an incentive to cruelty towards men. (Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, Principles of the Penal Code [1802], "To Prohibit Accessory Offences in Order to Prevent the Principle Offence")

There are two objects for the legislator:—1st, To give new force to the sentiment of benevolence; 2nd, To regulate its application according to the principle of utility.

1st. The legislator who wishes to inspire a people with humanity ought himself to give the first example of it. Let him show the utmost respect, not only for the lives of men, but for all the circumstances which have an influence upon their sensibility. Sanguinary laws have a tendency to render men cruel, by fear, by imitation, and by fostering a spirit of revenge. Mild laws humanize the manners of a nation; the spirit of the government is reproduced among the citizens.

The legislator ought to forbid everything that serves as as incitement to cruelty. The barbarous gladiatorial shows introduced at Rome, in the latter times of the republic, contributed, without doubt, to inspire that ferocity of spirit which the Romans displayed in their civil wars. Will a people accustomed to despise human life in their sports respect it in the rage of passion?

It is proper, for the same reason, to forbid every kind of cruelty to animals, whether by way of amusement or for the gratification of gluttony. Cock-fights and bull-fights, the chase of the hare and the fox, fishing, and other amusements of the same kind, necessarily suppose a want of reflection or a want of humanity; since these sports inflict upon sensitive beings the most lively sufferings, and the most lingering and painful death that can be imagined. Men must be permitted to kill animals; but they should be forbidden to torment them. Artificial death may be rendered less painful than natural death by simple proeesses, well worth the trouble of being studied, and of becoming an object of police. Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being? A time will come when humanity will spread its mantle over everything that breathes. The lot of slaves has begun to excite pity; we shall end by softening the lot of the animals which labour for us and supply our wants. (Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation [1802], Principles of the Penal Code, "The Culture of Benevolence")

FIRST CAUSE.—Repugnance of Sense.—Nothing is more common thatn the transition from a physical to a moral antipathy, especially with feeble minds. A mutitude of innocent animals suffer a continual persecution, because they have the misfortune to be thought ugly. Everything unusual has the power of exciting in us a sentiment of disgust and hatred. What is called a monster is only a being which differs a little from others of its kind. (Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, Principles of Legislation, "The Asetic Principle," "Causes of Antipathy")

I will add, that legislation might be extended further than it is in relation to the interests of the inferior animals.— What can be said to justify the useless torments they are made to suffer: the cruel caprices which are exercised upon them? Amontg the many reasons which might be given for making crimal such gratuitous cruelties, I confien myself to that which relates to my subject. It is a means of cultivating a general sentiment of benevolence, and of rendering men more mild; or at least of preventing the brutal depravity, which, after fleshing itself upon animal, presently demans human suffering to satiate its appetite. (Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation [1802], Principles of Legislation, "The Limits Which Seperate Morals from Legislation")

LIBERTY OF HUNTING UPON UNAPPROPRIATED GROUNDS.—…In civilized societies, where agriculture has made great progress, and where unappropriated lands bear only a small proportion to those which have received the impress of possession, there are many reasons against allowing this right of chase.…If this right of chase, so little advantageous when confined within such narrow limits, is still suffered to exist, the civil and penal code will need an assortment of laws to limit its exercise and to punish its excesses. This multiplication of laws is always an evil, because laws cannot be multiplied without being weakened. Besides, the severity necessary to prevent offences so easy and so attractive gives an odious character to property, and places the opulent in a state of war with their poor neighbours. The way to cut this matter short is not to regulate the right, but to suppress it. The prohibitive law being once known, no expectations will be formed of enjoying this privilege. Partridges will no more be coveted than pullets, and even in the minds of the multitude poaching will not be distinguished from theft. It is true that at the present day popular ideas are in favour of this right of hunting; but if a condescension is due to popular ideas, it is only upon occasions when they have a great power, and when there is little hope of changing them. Let pains be taken to enlighten the people, to make the motives of the law evident, to exhibit it as a means of peace and security, to show that the exercise of this right reduces itself almost to nothing, that the life of a hunter is miserable, that this ungrateful profession constantly exposes him who follows it to the commission of offences and his family to poverty and shame; and I dare to affirm that popular ideas, pressed by the continuous and mild force of reason, would presently assume a new direction. (Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, Principles of the Civil Code [1802], "Distribution of Property," "Liberty of Hunting Upon Unappropriated Grounds")

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1789 | Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [Printed: 1780; Published: 1789] Reprint of the London Edition of 1823 (London, 1907; Online at Library of Economics and Liberty).

1802| Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, 2nd Edition (London, 1871; Digitized by Google, 2007) [First Published in French, 1802; First English Edition, Theory of Legislation: 1864; Also published in part in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 1838-1842; see the preface of the 1914 edition for more information]